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ANGARSK AS A CHALLENGE FOR
THE EAST ASIAN ENERGY COMMUNITY∗
                                             By  Gaye Christoffersen (USA)
Introduction
A Northeast Asian multilateral energy regime, an energy community, has
been in the process of formation for at least two decades. In the early stages of
regime formation, there were many conferences held in the region. Eventually
an epistemic community of Northeast Asian energy specialists and analysts
emerged from Japan, China, South Korea, Russia, and sometimes the U.S.
One source of an Asian energy epistemic community has emerged from
ERINA, the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, based in Niigata,
Japan. The project, Energy Security and Sustainable Development: Prospects
for Cooperative Policies, has the goal of identifying impediments to regional
energy security cooperation and devising strategies to overcome them.1
Regional cooperation requires the harmonization of each country’s national
energy legislation and the formulation of energy policies that recognize energy
interdependence.2
A similar epistemic community is found in the East Asia energy Futures
Working Group organized by the Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California. This
network of researchers from the US, China, Japan, South Korea, DPRK, and
Russian Far East, in a series of workshops, worked on creating data sets and
designing national alternative energy paths. Eventually, this will lead to regional
paths integration, regional cooperation in an electricity grid, gas transmission
grid, conservation. The project will calculate costs and benefits of regional
cooperation in contrast to each country independently developing its energy
system. Included in the analysis is the assessment of energy security achieved
through regional cooperation.3
∗ The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not
reflect the policies or positions of any organization, the Naval Postgraduate School or the
US Government.
1 Vladimir Ivanov has written extensively on this topic, recently in “An Energy
Community for Northeast Asia: From a Dream to a Strategy,” ERINA Report vol.52 (June
2003), p.40-45
2 Ibid. p. 44
3 David Von Hippel. Summary Report of the East Asia Energy Futures Project Activities
and Accomplishments  Nautilus Institute, 2002, found at http://www.nautilus.org/energy/
eaef/futures.html
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The formulation of a Northeast Asian energy community has always
revolved around a formula of complementarity for a regional division of labor:
Russian resources, Chinese labor, and Japanese/Korean investment and
technology. This formula had served in lieu of rules for a Northeast Asian
energy community but it was insufficient, as it minimized China’s identity as a
net oil importer that put it in competition with other net oil importers. These
have might have been an implicit set of rules emerging but they were never
called “rules.”
The next stage of regime formation should have been rule formulation as
a multilateral regime is a collection of rules and norms. It was not until a series
of Middle-Eastern-related crises happened –9/11 and the Iraq war, which were
followed by an intensified search for non-Middle Eastern sources—that rule
formulation of Northeast Asia began to be articulated more explicitly. Energy
experts began to refer to rules.
Middle Eastern instability created new challenges for Chinese petroleum
strategies. The world petroleum industry appeared to be entering a new stage
after the US had secured what Chinese called the “control rights” over Iraq oil
production, and tightened its control over Middle East oil and thus the world
oil market. China’s petroleum strategy of “going out” in the world to explore
and develop oil resources had encountered numerous challenges-CNPC was
forced out of the auction of Slavneft, CNOOC was eliminated from participation
in the North Caspian Sea project.
In the past, because of self-reliance, world oil market disruptions were not
devastating to Chinese oil consumption, allowing China to choose a neutral
role towards crisis in oil geopolitics. But now with increasing oil import
dependence, China is faced with the vagaries of international resource
competition and China itself was not part of the International Energy Agency
(IEA) system of strategic oil reserves.4 China was only partially integrated into
the world oil system.
In the past, distrustful of multilateral energy regimes and feeling less
competitive in world markets, China had pursued bilateral oil diplomacy in
Russia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In bilateral
trade with countries such as Iran, Sudan and Libya, there was a possibility to
4 Amy Myers Jaffe, “China and Long-Range Energy Security,” Hearings on “China’s
Energy Needs and Strategies,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
October30, 2003, Washington D.C.
5 See Christofferson, “Socialist Integration and Energy Regimes,” Pacific Review v.3
n.1 (1990)
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make arms-for-oil deals. The bilateral oil relationship, Sino-Russian “strategic
partnership”, had seemed like a buffer to China’s increasing dependence on the
world oil market, but the endless negotiations over 9 years on the Angarsk-
Daqing oil pipeline did not produce a final agreement. The potential loss of the
“An-Da” pipeline put the “struggle for Angarsk” on a plane with the Iraq War,
amplified by Chinese newspapers’ outpouring of dismay that the project might
fall through.
The issue of Chinese energy security had been inserted into the 10th five-
year plan (2001-2005), for the first time recognizing it as a security issue. The
long-term Chinese strategies were continued: diversification of energy import
sources away from the Middle East, increased overseas investments by the
Chinese oil companies, increased domestic investment, and energy conservation.
To these enduring policy goals were added (1) the need for a strategic petroleum
reserve and (2) participation in an East Asian energy community. The latter
required a paradigm shift in Chinese thinking, i.e., that a multilateral energy
regime could protect Chinese national interests.
The year 2003 was a difficult time for following the workings of Northeast
Asian regional energy cooperation as endless meetings in Moscow by
delegations from Beijing and Tokyo produced no agreement on the direction of
oil and gas pipelines from Angarsk. Russia developed a plan for Siberian and
Russia Far Eastern oil and gas resources but postponed decision on pipelines.
Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) had announced in
spring 2003 that a 10-year long-term energy policy that would consider
alternatives to dependency on Middle Eastern supply would be finished by the
summer. By September, Japan’s plan was still not published because it was
awaiting decisions made in Moscow. China had announced formulation of an
Energy Security Plan with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao personally overseeing
its prompt formulation, but domestic planning was contingent on regional
energy plans and decisions made in Moscow. Each of these three countries
had domestic plans requiring coordination with the other countries in a regional
framework that did not exist in 2003.
The “struggle for Angarsk” would answer the question analysts had
pondered throughout the 1990s: were Northeast Asian energy relations
fundamentally cooperative or competitive. The concept of a Northeast Asian
energy relations   fundamentally cooperative or competitive .The concept of a
Northeast Asian regional energy regime has long history , and it is difficult to
believe that it could so easily be pushed aside over the routing of a pipeline
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.China , Japan and Russia , in what could be called a two –level bargaining game
, each took a path towards regional cooperation that involved reconciling
conflicting domestic interests into a national consensus, necessary before there
could be a regional consensus.
China’s Path: making the case for cooperation, reform
Earlier work done by the author, Crouching Oil Dragons-Hidden Gas
Bears: Sino-Russian Oil &  Gas Relations in Northeast Asian Energy
Community, raised the issue of whether Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation
had the character of an exclusive bilateral alliance, or whether it could be the
basis of a regional, Northeast Asian or Asia Pacific, energy community.6 The
thesis was not Sino-Russian energy cooperation was extraordinarily protracted
because the two sides use a different calculus in deciding energy projects.
China’s state-owned enterprises are more market-oriented and consider energy
security with an economic calculus and cost-benefit analysis, while Russia’s
private oil companies are more statist and Russians tend to equate energy
security with physical control of petroleum. This could explained by (1) structural
factors-the domestic and world oil markets, or (2) subjective factors-a
transformation of consciousness, or (3) the result of interaction between both
types of factors. The conclusion was that the region would have to a wait a
long time to form an energy community built on the Sino-Russian oil project.
It has been a long, convoluted path for China to accept that Chinese
energy security had become mutually interdependent with Asia-Pacific regional
energy security. Although China had been until the mid-1990s very negative on
participation in multilateral regimes, that changed through membership in APEC
and ARF. By 1998, some Chinese would also support the concept of a regional
“East Asian Energy Community” and creation of a regional energy security
system.7 In early 1998, Ji Guoxing acknowledged
Asian Pacific energy security is inseparable from China’s energy security…
without China’s participation and cooperation, Asian Pacific energy security is
unrealistic and unworkable; and without others’ cooperation, neither can China‘s
own energy security be guaranteed.8
6 “Crouching Oil Dragons-Hidden Gas Bears: Sino-Russian Oil & Gas Relations in a
Northeast Asian Energy Community,” in Dalnii Vostok Rossii I severo-vostochnaya azia
(Russian Far East and Northeast Asia), Sergey Sevastionov, ed., Vladivostok 2001.
7 Gao Shixian, “China”, in Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia, (Tokyo; Japan
Center for International Exchange, November 2000), p. 43-58
8 Ji Guoxing, “China versus Asian Pacific Energy Security,” The Korean Journal of
Defense Analysis vol.10, no.2, (Winter 1998), p.112
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He suggested China was ready to put energy security on the policy agenda
in regional forums at a higher priority level, and that it would move regional
cooperation to a new level, either in APEC or the ASEAN Regional Forum,
although both organizations needed strengthening to be effective. The benefits
would be to: 1. Alleviate “regional energy tensions” that emerge, especially
between China and Japan; 2. Contribute to building cooperative security in
regional forums; 3. further integrate China into the international community.9
In February 1999, a major report was issued that indicated Chinese
rethinking of energy security issues. China’s Energy Research Institute (ERI),
under the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC, now SDRC), issued
Study in Long Term Energy Development Strategies of China (Zhongguo
Zhongchangqi Nengyuan Zhanlue), Zhou Fengqi and Zhou Dadi, eds. The
report called for a radical break with past Chinese practices for energy security,
changing from a coal-dependent, self-sufficient energy policy to the expansion
of natural gas production and increasing imports of oil and LNG.
The two Zhous argued that China’s closed system and reluctance to
import oil would undermine environmental security. They argued for reliance
on pipeline systems similar to European and American practice, and increased
integration with world energy markets, stating “The globalization of the world
economy and multipolar trend in political relations is working in favor of China’s
access to international markets and Chinese energy security.”10 And they further
argued “China should actively participate in regional energy groupings” thus
linking China’s energy security to Japan’s energy security.
At the Japan-China Petroleum Economics Forum 2001, held September 3-
5, 2001, Chinese and Japanese oil economists exchanged opinions on energy
security, exchanging information on the strategies of the Japanese oil industry
and strategies of the Chinese oil industry. The forum’s report
concluded…energy issues are not unilateral issues, and cannot be solved
unilaterally. In this sense, regarding potential energy security for the Northeast
Asian energy market, alliances and/or cooperation between Japan and China
are imperative.11
9  Ibid., p.141
10  Zhou Fengqi and Zhou Dadi, eds. Study on Long Term Energy Development Strategies
of China (Zhongguo Zhongchangqi Nengyuan Zhanlue). (Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua
Chubanshe, 1999), translated by US Embassy Beijing, at http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/
english/sandt/adpcenergy.html.
11 Shishi Kaku. Japan-China Petroleum Economics Forum 2001. Tokyo: Institute of
Energy Economics, November 2001, p.10
109
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs Number 11, 2004
The purpose of the Forum is not only information exchange to increase
policy transparency, but also to impress upon China that Chinese energy policies
impact the entire region, and the region needs knowledge of China’s strategies
to plan for regional energy security.
The Japanese project to encourage Chinese participation in regional
energy security appeared effective, as Zhou Dadi, the director of the Chinese
Energy Research Institute, recently stated, A comprehensive regional
approach by all of us would be better than letting the vagaries of the marketplace
decide what happens…if everything is left to each company, each country,
each interest group, China will have to think of itself and give priority to its own
immediate pressure and demands. It would be much better for everybody if we
adopt a regional approach.12
Chinese participation in regional planning required stronger domestic
plans. In March 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji, at the fourth session of the Ninth
National People’s Congress, had called for a national oil strategy. Energy planners
followed through 9/11 made it even more urgent.
In October 2001, the State Economic and Trade Commission claimed a
national law was needed to guarantee the country’s oil security. The SPDC had
submitted a draft to the NPC for the law which would bring order to the domestic
oil market and create a fair environment for domestic and foreign companies
after China joined the WTO. The law would be managed by an energy
commission.13
At the end of 2002, Beijing had finalized its “21st Century Oil Strategy,” a
plan jointly produced by the State Economic and Trade Commission and the
state planning Commission—
• Resurrect the State Energy Commission and give it responsibility for
creating a futuristic strategic oil system for China.
• Invest $100 billion in the system. Invest in 4 large domestic oil fields.
• Implement the “go out” strategy through joint ventures overseas.
• Build a strategic oil reserve.
• Develop oil shipping capacity and strong navy and air force capable
of protecting China’s marine resources and energy supplies.14
12 Quoted in Selig. S. Harrison, “Gas and Geopolitics in Northeast Asia: Pipelines, Regional
Stability, and Korean Nuclear Crisis,” World Policy Journal (Winter 2002/03), p.36
13 “PRC Analyst Views State Law Proposed to Strengthen Oil Security,” China Daily
Business Weekly Supplement, October 30, 2001
14 Kung Shuangyin, “Invest $100 Billion in Building Strategic Oil System,” Ta Kung
Pao, Nov.13, 2002
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This domestic plan had not been formulated in consultation with other
countries but rather was the product of the planning system, the command
economy. It would rely on strengthening state capacity to manage oil, state
funds to create a strategic reserve, and a stronger military capability to protect
energy supply.
In November 2002, Zhongguo Nengyuan published an article on the impact
of the Middle East war on the world oil market leading to lower prices and cheap
oil.  This impacted China’s petroleum industry negatively since it was not
competitive—its exploration and production costs at $17/barrel were higher
than the world average, in fact, the highest in the world. Some domestic fields
were prospected when it was not economically profitable. The Chinese oil
industry could only survive when oil prices were high. China faced an energy
management crisis that required a comprehensive energy strategy.15
In April 2003 a roundtable discussion at People’s University focused on
the impact of the Iraq war in international energy and Chinese energy interests.
The meeting identified five questions on china’s energy security requiring
further research: finding the appropriate energy mix, determining the greatest
threat to Chinese oil imports and security of the SLOCs, promoting an East
Asian energy Community, the appropriate governmental organization for
managing energy—energy commission or bureau, and creating strategic oil
reserves.16 It was noted that China had minimal interest in an East Asian Energy
Community and didn’t view it as a means to energy security.
Organizationally, China has strengthened state capacity to pursue energy
security by establishing an Energy Bureau under the State Development and
Reform Commission. Chinese oil companies had lobbied for the bureau in order
to facilitate the Chinese state’s approval process for overseas investments.
The bureau is examining Russian and American energy strategies for lessons.
Chinese have a sense that Russian, American, and Japanese energy diplomacy
and oil security strategies are more fully developed Than China’s, leaving China
to face competition in an uneven playing field.17
15 Yan Lin, “Middle East War, Cheap Oil and China’s Strategy,” Zhongguo Nengyuan
no.11, Nov.25, 2002, p.12-15
16 Zha Daojiong, “China’s Energy Security after the Iraq War: summary report of a
roundtable discussion,” Center for International Energy Security, Renmin University of
China, Beijing, April 8, 2003
17 Feng Yujun, Ding Xiaoxing and Li Dong, “Russia’s New Energy Diplomacy and Its
Impact,” Contemporary International Relations vol.12, no.10 (October 2002)
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The Iraq War influenced China as it did Japan, driving it to consider better
strategies for oil security. Chinese analysis examined numerous attempts to
invest overseas that had suffered setbacks. The SLOCS from the Middle East
were fragile. The Caspian Sea had become an empty promise. In addition, Beijing
was surprised when “Japan and Korea tried to derail the Angarsk-Daqing oil
pipeline.”18 Even before 9/11, the need for an oil security system was widely
discussed in the Chinese press, including participating in international energy
regimes, APEC conferences on energy, dialoguing with OPEC, strengthening
cooperation with the Middle East, Russia, Central Asia, and Africa.19
Following the Iraq War, the need to map out a new oil strategy became
even more urgent20
Russia’s Path: Choosing a Domestic Plan
Russia’s domestic plan, Main Provisions of the Russian Energy Strategy
to 2020, originally approved in November 2000, with a newer revised version
approved May 22, 2003, seemed to settle Russian domestic priorities. However,
the question of which pipeline to give priority to would not be finalized in clear
manner.
It seemed to be a long, drawn-out convoluted process, mixing geopolitics
with technical questions, with lots of simultaneous domestic and international
bargaining. Moscow had conducted parallel negotiations with CNPC and JNOC
during 2003 without a means to make the two dialogues coherent.  There were
actually 3 proposals on the table:
1. Japanese proposal: Angarsk to Nakhodka 50MMT capacity with export
possibilities to all of Asia-Pacific including the US (preferred by Japan, Rosneft,
and Transneft) called the “northern route.”
2. Chinese proposal: Angarsk to Daqing 30MT capacity, confined to
China market (preferred by China and Yukos) called the “southern route.”
3. Russian Energy Ministry and energy experts’ proposal: A compromise
to combine Japanese and Chinese projects into one project that would first go
to Daqing, and then when there was sufficient oil, extend to Nakhodka, Beijing
was agreeable to the compromise but Tokyo was not.
18 Wang Yiwei, “China’s Foreign Oil is hanging by a Thread,” Zhongguo Gongshang
Shibao, June 30, 2003, p.5, in FBIS, CPP20030730000198.
19 Wang Chun and Qi Yanqiu, “Strategic Considerations on establishing China’s Future
Oil Security System,” Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Daxue Xuebao no.2, March 31, 2001
20 FBIS Report, “China: Mapping Out New Oil Strategy to Avert Oil Crisis,” in FBIS,
April 4, 2003, CPP20030404000159.
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The Chinese had thought that the feasibility study was finished, and that
the Sino-Russian agreement that had been signed in Moscow in May 2003 was
a final contract, but it was only a general agreement on basic principles signed
between Yukos and CNPC without a final decision by the Russian government
on the pipeline feasibility study. According the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, controlled
by Boris Berezovskiy, private Russian companies must act on their own when
the Russian state fails on energy policy.21
Political struggles over the three proposals all took place within Russia—
struggles over the Russian Energy Strategy to 2020, struggles between
Transneft and YUKOS, struggles between the Russian government and the
Russian oil companies. In May 2003, the Russian Energy Strategy to 2020 had
been “largely approved.” It was originally reported to have an Angarsk-
Nakhodka pipeline in it. Some reports claimed it included both projects: Entering
the Asia Pacific market will create the need to develop the pipeline system to
the East to China and Sea of Japan. The construction oil and gas pipelines in a
single technological corridor in this region best serves the interests of the
state, the socio-economic development of Eastern Siberia and the Far East, and
comprehensive development of mineral resources.
Thus, the Russian government seems to have opted for the compromise
proposal. Yet everything depended on the unending feasibility study (or
perhaps numerous feasibility studies) that after nine years still did not have
closure. Transneft claimed the decision would be made 2 weeks after the energy
strategy was final. Rosneft proposed that its gas pipeline be integrated with the
YUKOS oil pipeline in the southern route as a means to make the project more
economically feasible. Rosneft, however, is more supportive of the northern
route. Tyumen Oil Co. manager Sergei Tulinov claimed, “A feasibility study has
not yet been carried out for any project in the region and as there are no
feasibility studies, there is no sense in talking about transport schemes.”
The original rationale for a Sino-Russian oil pipeline years ago was that,
because Sino-Russian trade driven by market forces had not expanded as
expected, what it needed was “mega-project” to “kick-start” bilateral economic
and trade relations. The pipeline became the mega-project. Why a nine-year
feasibility study can never find closure is a consequence of both sides evolving
away from planned economies, but not necessarily in coordination with each
other, so that the concept of “economic feasibility” has different meanings
21 M.Borisova and P.Orekhin, “China will Grow on Russian Oil,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
May 29, 2003
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over time. In the past, Soviet and Chinese planners would have worked out a
mega-project without a cost-benefit analysis. However, unlike Russian and
Chinese energy decisions made under the old systems, economic feasibility is
a more important criterion than it was nine years ago.
Entering into the equation during summer 2003 was the “YUKOS Affair,”
which came to be referred to as the “Kremlin versus Yukos war” and indicated
a crisis in relations between the Russian State and business. Although there
were, much larger issues involved than the question of pipelines, this attack on
YUKOS made the southern route seem less viable.22
Local Considerations in Primorye
The pipeline became an issue for Primorye in summer 2003. Primorye
Governor Sergei Darkin, in trips to Tokyo and meetings with Japanese officials
in Vladivostok, lobbied for Northern route. A Primorye delegation on a visit to
Tokyo met with Japan’s Foreign Minister, the METI Minister, and the Japan
National Oil Corporation. Possibly, as a result of his efforts, the northern route
came to include an oil refinery in one of Primorye’s ports. Although the decision
would not be made in Primorye, the Japanese lobbied at all levels of government.
A delegation from the Japanese Association for Trade with Russia and Eastern
Europe (ROTOBO) and Keidanren visited in June 2003 to further economic
links between Primorye and Japan. Governor Darkin expressed his distrust of
YUKOS, accusing the company of intentionally underestimating resources as
a means of promoting the southern route.
Zolotoy Rog reported that the Russian public had little information about
the choice of a Chinese or Japanese pipeline and believed that the Russian oil
companies were withholding information. Conferences were organized by the
krai administration and UNESCAP to discuss local financial and environmental
impacts of the project. In a July meeting between Putin and Darkin, the Primorye
Governor argued for the need for a political solution, which would define
Primorye’s future and integrate the krai into the Asia-Pacific.
In August 2003, a joint Russian-Japanese group began work on a feasibility
study for the northern route with the promise the study would be finished by
December 2003, remarkably fast given the nine years the Sino-Russian feasibility
study has taken. The Russian Energy Ministry in late August 2003 asked the
Chinese side to postpone the August 27-29 scheduled meeting of the
22 The YUKOS Affair and the Consequences for Russia’s Future,” Novoe Vremya, August
24, 2003
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Subcommittee for Energy Cooperation of the intergovernmental commission.
The committee’s agenda would have focused on the pipeline in preparation for
the September 22 meeting between Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and premier
Wen Jiabao, Officially the ministry claimed the feasibility study for pipeline was
not yet finished., but also confirmed speculation that Moscow would shift to
the northern route, not a decision the Ministry would have made, giving the
appearance of a highly politicized decision-making process. Rather than being
in control of the bargaining, Russia publications warned that Russia was
allowing itself to be a card to be played in a high-stakes geo-political game
between Japan and China. 23
In early February 2004, The Russian Dep. Foreign Minister Aleksandr
Losyukov had announced that Russia was considering several options, not
mutually exclusive, and would “give priority to its own interests when selecting
which option to follow” rather than posing it is a choice between China and
Japan.24 Transneft presented a plan that it announced was a completely new
export pipeline: it begins at Taishet, extends to Buryatia further away from lake
Baikal, and then follows that path of the earlier Angarsk-Nakhodka route. The
pipeline would be 4,130 kilometers, transport 56MMT/year, and have 32 pumping
stations (13 have storage facilitates). This Transneft plan had gotten the approval
of local governments in Primorye, Khabarovsk, and the Amur region. An
alternative plan had been drawn up by the Sakha Republic (Yakuta), Gazprom,
Surgutneftegaz, and the Natural Resources Ministry. Their route would
construct a single network, combining oil and gas pipelines, 6, 224 kilometers
that linked all oil and gas fields in Yakuta, Irkutsk, and Krasnodarsk, ending in
Nakhodka.25
The Russian retreat from the southern route posed problems for Chinese
domestic planning. China had put oil imports from the Russian pipeline into its
current five-year plan (2000-2005). During Hu Jintao’s May 23 visit to Moscow,
Putin had expressed much optimism on future energy cooperation and
partnership, but also seemed to distance the issue from politics when he said
“it is up to experts to decide on the construction of oil $ gas pipelines from
Russia to China and their routes.” A few days later, Putin and Koizumi in St.
23 Yuriy Aleksandrov, “Japan Counterattacks: Intensity Rises in Battle between Two
Asian Superpowers over Russian Oil Pipeline,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 22, 2003, in
FBIS, CEP20030822000031
24 ITAR-TASS, February 11, 2004, in FBIS, CEP20040212000278
25 Interfax Oil & Gas, March 25-April 1, 2004
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Petersburg also talked energy projects, with Koizumi still lobbying claiming, “I
told President Putin that Japan’s Business sector is interested in the Nakhodka
pipeline.”
Chinese Rethinking Post Angarsk
In June 2003, Chinese analysts had called for adjusting China’s oil strategy
in response to the aftermath of the Iraq War. The “going abroad” strategy was
presented as a must in order for China to avert an oil crisis. Although the
Central Committee had directed Chinese oil companies to go abroad in 1999, the
“struggle for Angarsk” challenged the “going abroad” strategy. Because the
Middle East appeared unstable, Chinese oil companies diversified into Australia,
Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa.26 The “struggle for Angarsk”
had led Chinese to rethink whether the Sino-Russian   strategic partnership
could ensure Chinese energy security. This had followed several other incidents:
CNPC was forced to give up participation rights in the auction of Russia’s Slav
Oil Company: CNOOC was shut out of the North Caspian Sea Project. Analysts
argued that China would have to draw lessons from other major oil-consuming
nations, the US and Europe, for methods for dealing with oil-producing nations,
and change its oil strategy.27
Those who advocated energy cooperation elaborated further on a
cooperative strategy. A meeting of the Chinese Society of Asia-Pacific Studies
in August 2003 was an appropriate forum. Yu Xintian viewed the establishment
of an East Asian ASEAN+3 network for energy cooperation a logical follow-on
regional institution building to the financial network already created to prevent
another regional financial crisis. The benefits were many: Russian Far Eastern
oil would reach Southeast Asia through Northeast Asia; Indonesian and
Malaysian natural gas transported to Northeast Asia; power generation from
the Greater Mekong river basin; joint exploration of South China Sea oil and
gas resources; the creation of a “cooperation mechanism” between East Asian
consumers and Middle Eastern producers. East Asian identity would be the
glue for regional integration.28
26 Li Dingxin, “Fighting for Oil Pipeline Tests China’s Energy Policy,” Jingji Gankao
Bao, August 8, 2003, in CPP20030813000222
27 Zhou Yonggang, “China’s Oil Strategy needs to be repositioned,” Zhongguo
Gongshang Shibao, June 3, 2003, p.2, in CPP20030709000153
28 Yu Xintian, “East Asian Cooperation in the Early 21st Century,” paper presented at
the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Chinese Society of Asia-Pacific Studies, in Dangdai Yatai,
no.10 October 15, 2003, p.3-9
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In august 2003, Zhongguo Nengyuan pointed out those solutions to
Chinese energy issues required sustainable energy strategies including energy
conservation, clean coal technology, and optimization of energy utilization.
The Energy Research Institute had been advocating energy rationality since
the early 1980s, and this was still the solution to avert an energy crisis.29 The
post-Angarsk atmosphere created a more receptive audience than the ERI had
encountered before.
In September 2003, it was announced that China was “gradually formulating
a brand plan for its energy strategy” because the Angarsk-Daqing project had
problems and could not be relied upon. A work report had been presented to
Premier Wen Jiabao by Qu Guangming on May 26, 2003, for the “Strategic
Research Group for Sustained Development of Petroleum in China” of the
Chinese Academy of Engineering. (This group had begun in early 2002). It
rapidly increased in size as researchers from CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC, Sinochem
joined until it had over 100 experts. 30
Another report by a different research group mapped out a long term
energy strategy to be used for planning by the State Development and Reform
Commission (presented June 9, 2003). The group had identified 10 new oil and
gas development zones domestically it would conduct a feasibility study on
the Ordos basin, and it would investigate third-nation oil and gas resources.
Both research groups emphasized development of both domestic and
international resources.31
In November 2003, Guoji Luntan published an article on China’s oil
diplomacy, claiming that the struggle for Angarsk demonstrated that China’s
oil diplomacy lacked the capacity to manage sudden incident. Suggestions for
strengthening capacity all focused and greater integration in the world oil
economy: take a more active part in Middle East affairs, strengthen cooperation
with peripheral states Russia, Central Asia, and Caspian, and strengthen
cooperation with major oil-consuming states and international oil organizations
by joining the IEA. All of this would augment China’s capacity to withstand oil
shocks.32
29 Zhang Jianmin, “Sustainable Energy Strategy to Meet the Goal to Quadruple China’s
GDP by 2020,” Zhongguo Nengyyan vol.25 no.8, August 8, 2003, p.1
30 Chen Ting, “Sino-Russian Oil Pipeline has Obstacles and Takes Time, China Initiates
New Energy Strategy,” 21 Shiji Jingji Baodao, September 22, 2003
31 Ibid
32 Gong Xuzheng, “Viewing China’s Oil Diplomacy from the ‘Angarsk-Daqing Line’
Tussle,” Guoji Luntan no.6 November 10, 2003, p.46-52, in CPP20031217000209
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A November 2003 conference on “China’s Energy Strategy and Reform”
was held in Beijing. Energy planners blamed the current crisis on governmental
decisions made a decade before when the Ministry of Energy was abolished.
Since then, all efforts at reforming the oil industry and efforts to formulate a
sustainable energy policy had disappointed. Since 1993, China’s energy
industry had passed through several stages of market-oriented reforms,
attempting to create a market-oriented energy policy for without a Ministry of
Energy managing it, but results had been disappointing. Energy problems in
recent years, termed a “petroleum crisis,” encouraged these planners to once
again call for unified state institution to manage energy. Although an Energy
Bureau, headed by Xu Dingming, had been established in March 2003, it was
rumored to lack authority and a clear mandate. Xu is also in charge of the
National Petroleum Reserve Office.33
That same month, the Jingji Ribao, relying on market solutions, advised
that there was “no need to be overly concerned about strategic oil security”
because
• the US, EU, and Japan were more vulnerable and had a larger oil security
problem than China;
• higher oil prices promoted technological progress towards energy
efficiency and sustainable development;
• although prices would rise, the crude oil supply in the world oil market
was adequate;
• China would more energetically implement the going abroad strategy
to acquire oil field resources in South America, Middle east, Russia, Central
Asia, and Africa;
• China would emulate Japan, the US, and South Korea by creating a
strategic petroleum reserve;34
In 2003, Chinese crude oil imports were estimated to be 91.12 MMT and
petroleum product at 28.24 MMT, up 31.3% and 38.8%, and costing a total of
$16.5 billion. These were sharp increases from 2002 at 69.4 MMT. These oil
imports cost the country $16.5 billion.35 Energy shortages and blackouts were
common, the worst in a decade. The coastal regions were especially hard hit in
33 Wang Yichao, “China’s Energy Woes,” Gaijing, December 10, 2003
34 Ji Xing et al, “Rising oil prices no cause for concern, but Chinese oil enterprises
should pursue outward strategy more energetically,” Jingji Ribao, November 19, 2003, in
FBIS, CPP20031119000072
35 “Chinese Oil Imports Exceeds 100 Million Tons in 2003,” Xinhua, February 8,
2004, in CPP20040208000002
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summer 2003. The coastal cities were said to be “racing” to build marine oil
terminals to capture a larger share of oil imports. Chinese ports with deepwater
marine oil terminals capable of handling supertankers were few: Qingdao,
Zhoushan, Ningbo, Maoming and Zhanjiang.36
In early 2004, Chinese contemplated responses to what was considered a
looming oil crisis. Reformers were much more vocal and critical, and had a more
receptive audience than they had in the early 1980s. The State Development
and Reform Commission Minister, Ma Kai, stressed energy conservation, which
had been officially promoted for 24 years but neglected in investment priorities
that continually expanded supply instead. Energy conservation was now
constituted as an energy security issue that required better state planning in
the 11th five-year energy conservation plan.37
Energy reformers criticized the planning approach. Zhao Jianping, energy
specialist with the World Bank, argued that “The current energy shortage
reflects the failure of the government’s command and control’ approach to
address energy sector issues” because the bureaucracy is unable to adapt
quickly enough to changing demand. The State Development and Reform
Commission sits at the center of a web of control, regulating and supervising
private participation in energy. The Commission had expected a 5% increase in
power consumption, but instead demand had grown at 15%. Local governments
were pressuring the Commission to accelerate its approval of power plant
construction but it had imposed a 3-year freeze. Zhao claimed the Commission
was under-funded and under-staffed, lacking capacity to do project analysis.
He called for the government to move from making project decisions to a
coherent energy policy framework, and to create an invest-friendly environment
for companies.38
Although China has always been dependent on the SLOCs passing
through the Malacca Straits since it first started importing oil from the Middle
East, it was at this time that China developed a “Malacca Strait Predicament”
which was constituted a “crisis” requiring several measures:
1. Constitution of routes into Southeast Asia: the Bangkok-Kunming
Mekong waterway, the Kunming-Bangkok highway, the Pan-Asian railroad,
36 Olivia Chung, “Coastal cities race to Tap Soaring Oil Shipments,” Hong Kong
Standard, Feb.5, 2004
37 Ma Kai, “Vigorously Push forward Energy Conservation Work, Strive to Build
Energy Conservation Society,” Jingji Ribao, Nov.4, 2003, p.6, in FBIS,
CPP2003111000035
38 Xie Ye, “Energy Sector Reform Urged,” China Daily (Internet Version), Jan.8, 2004
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and the Nanning-Hanoi highway. All of these would “pave the way for China’s
oil strategy.”
2. Constitution of a supertanker fleet with sufficient capacity; China
depended on chartered vessels giving other countries control.
3. Construction of a powerful naval force to ensure security of the SLOCs.
4. A governmental report suggested that China, Japan, and South Korea
jointly construct a canal, the Kola Canal, through Thailand’s Isthmus of Kra, an
“Asian Panama Canal” of approximately 90-10 kilometers, depending on which
route is chosen, which would reach the Andaman Sea.39
The military used it as an opportunity to call for expansion of its budget,
and perhaps its mission. PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff Xiong Guangkai,
in assessing the world situation following the Iraq War, advocated strengthening
national defense and increasing defense budgets for reasons that included a
sense that resource competition was escalating worldwide. China’s dependence
on the Middle East for half of its oil imports required that Beijing take a strategic
perspective in addressing energy problems.40
An analysis supportive of the PLA and regional cooperation came from
Xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiusuo which integrated energy and military security
issues as it argued that under the impact of globalization a nation’s energy
security is also a military issue not just an economic issue. China’s position
was becoming increasingly vulnerable as its oil import dependence grew
because it lacked the diplomatic and military influence of a country such as the
US. The Chinese navy could not secure the SLOCs from the Middle East as the
US navy could. The author felt China should not adopt an energy security
policy modeled on the US and Europe, at least until it had expanded its naval
capacity. “China must consider the needs of other energy-hungry countries in
Asia, especially in northeastern Asia, as it formulated it energy security policy.”
Japan in particular should benefit from China’s east-west natural gas pipeline,
building a common bond through energy cooperation.41 It was unusual to discuss
energy cooperation and military security in the same analysis.
39 Zhang Yuncheng, “The Malacca Strait and World Oil Security,” Huanqiu Shibao,
Dec.5, 2003, in FBIS, CPP20031217000202 Guo Ling, “Experts Suggest Need to Build a
‘Panarama Canal’ in Asia,” Wen Wei Po, Jan.14, 2004
40 “Military Calls for Stepping Up National Defense Construction,” Ming Pao (Hong
Kong) Feb.3, 2004
41 Zhang Wenmu, “China’s Energy Security and Policy Choices,” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi
no.5, May 14, 2003, p.11-16, in FBIS, CPP20030528000169
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Cooperation with Japan was presented by reformers as a source of
solutions for Chinese energy conservation, especially in the auto industry
where escalating automobile utilization put pressure on demand for transport
fuels.42 Cooperation with U.S. was publicly acknowledged by Vice Premier Zeng
Peiyan during US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham’s visit to Beijing in
January 2004. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission had
held hearings in October 2003 on “China’s Energy Needs and Strategies.”
Analysts at the hearing had urged greater cooperation with China since Chinese
energy security policy was still in the process of formation.43
Japanese newspaper noted that China’s “Resource Diplomacy” had
become more active. Japan National Oil Company (JNOC) observed that China
was conducting exploration in 24 countries and planned to increase its stock
pile from a few days to 50 days. JNOC saw China using resource diplomacy in
a ‘niche strategy’ as
1. China’s means to build a political and economic stronghold;
2. A hedge, such as diversification of supply, in case the United States
closes up access to the oil market.44
Li Zhidong, Chinese professor at Nagaoka University of Technology,
was quoted as saying “Some people say Japan is trying to aid China’s supply
system. Since demand is most certainly going to increase, Japan and China
should aim for cooperative ties.” However, the “struggle for Angarsk” had led
Japanese to call for a restructuring of Japan’s energy strategy with greater
emphasis on security.45
Japan’s Path
Japanese support for regional cooperation is not new. Japanese energy
planners have long believed that Japanese energy security would only be
attained when energy security for the Asian region as a whole, especially China,
42 Zhang Jifeng, “Chinese-Japanese cooperation in auto industry will create win-win
situation, reduce competition for energy,” Guoji maoyi, January 20, 2004, p.32-36, in
FBIS, CPP20040213000167
43 Kang Wu, “Outlook for Energy and Economic Developments in China,” Hearings
on “China’s Energy Needs and Strategies,” US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, October 30, 2003, Washington, D.C
44 Toshu Noguchi, “China: World’s Second-Largest Oil-Consuming Nation Uses Active




The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs Number 11, 2004
was attained. There were challenges to translating to thoughts of a few energy
planners into Japanese national policy. There were challenges to socilizing
Chinese energy experts into the norms of a shared collective regional energy
security, away from deeply ingrained nationalists, self-reliant approaches. The
greatest challenge was establishing a regional leadership position by providing
an international public good—regional energy security—the consumption of
which by all nations does not diminish its availability to others.
A regional framework had begun to emerge following Prime Minister
Koizumi’s announcement in January 2002 that Tokyo intended to form an Asian
Energy Community, using ASEAN+3 as the framework. Tokyo’s project would
create an “international public good,” regional energy security, for all Northeast
Asian countries. Tokyo, as provider of this international public good, would
take on a regional leadership role in an area that is vital to Japanese national
interests and to regional security and stability. China has benefited from this
regional international public good.46
It was in summer 2001 that the Advisory Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources had issued a report for the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI) that recommended. Japan’s energy security be situated within the
Asian region’s energy security to be considered as a whole.47 The new plan
revised downward estimated Japanese oil demand, reduced nuclear power
construction, and expanded utilization of natural gas from 13% to 20% of total
energy consumption to meet Kyoto targets. The plan recommended
strengthened energy conservation and greater investment in Middle Eastern
producer countries, as the relationship between the Middle East and East Asia
was increasingly interdependent, kept stable by a producer-consumer
dialogue.48
1. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on Japan’s
approaches for energy security in August 2001, outlining six issues of Japanese
energy diplomacy:
2. Maintain a strategic oil reserve for emergency response
46 For further elaboration on Japan’s role in the region see Christoffersen, “The
Politics of oil Security in East Asia,” presented at an Institute for Global Conflict and
Cooperation conference, “Global and Regional Security Governance,” University of
California, San Diego, October 3, 2002
47 “editorial: energy security requires all Asian nations’ Cooperation,” Asahi Shimbun,
August 2, 2201, www.asahi.com/english/op-ed/K2001080200582.html
48 Tsutomu Toichi, Managing Director, IEEJ. “Japan’s Energy policy and its implications
for the Economy” IEEJ (April 2002), p.12-13
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3. Maintain friendly relations with producing countries and the Middle
East, and countries along the SLOCs
4. Diversify energy supply and oil supply sources. Develop new sources
such as Iran and Sakhalin. Increase natural gas utilization.
5. Energy savings and efficiency
6. Energy security for Asia through international organizations such
as IEA, APEC, Energy Working Group, and bilateral energy consultations.
Establishing a legal framework through the Energy Charter Treaty. Deepening
interdependence and cooperation with Asian countries.
7. Environmental issues addressed in conjunction with energy issues.
The Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gases.49
A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official on May 8, 2002, announced
that Japan urgently needed to lay the foundations for an “Asian Community.”
By this, he meant Asian economic integration with standardized economic rules
throughout the region. The Japan-Singapore FTA that the Japanese Diet had
just approved would be the model for further agreements. Japan had in the past
been cautious about promoting an “Asian Community” because of expected
strong objections from China. However, now that China was in the WTO, had
just signed a proposal for studying a China-ASEAN FTA in November 2001,
and would economically integrate further with the region, the time was ripe for
the Community.50
In July 2003, the Managing Director of the Institute of Energy Economics,
Tsutomu Toichi, pointed out that because of several trends—the insecurity of
9/11, increasing regional economic integration—Japanese energy policy was
in transition, thus”…new energy security measures that include the greater
Asian region are needed to replace those based on unilateral thinking.”51 Toichi
argued Japan needed to coordinate energy policy and security policy, and
coordinate energy diplomacy and environmental diplomacy. Japan needed to
develop greater influence with Middle Eastern producers by building up
cooperative relations with China, Korea, and Taiwan to increase the bargaining
49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Issues of Japan’s Energy Diplomacy: Approaches
for Energy Security. August 2001, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/energy/diplomacy.html
50 “Japan Building’ Asian Community’: Official,”Jiji Press in English (Tokyo), May 8,
2002, in FBIS, Doc. ID no.: JPP20020508000083
51 Tsutomu Toichi, Managing Director, Chief Executive Economist. Energy Security
in Asia and Japanese Policy The Institute of Energy Economics Japan, July 2003, found
at: http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/index.html.
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leverage of a Northeast Asian bloc. Oil and natural gas pipelines from the
Russian Far East would also increase leverage with the Middle East. His
proposals included an Asian version of the International Energy Agency (IEA).
He expressed frustration with the China-Russia negotiations for a natural gas
pipeline as “mired in disagreements over selection of a pipeline route, pricing,
and various other issues,” which he claimed had led Russia to encourage South
Korea and Japan to become more actively involved rather than passively waiting
to participate in a Sino-Russian pipeline.52
Suspicion of Japanese Intentions emerged in the popular Chinese press.
In summer 2003, China Daily was openly referring to a Sino-Japanese rivalry
for Russian oil, recognizing that Japan had lobbied heavily, and dangled financial
incentives. The Chinese suspected that Japan was “playing on Russia historical
fears of China.” The newspaper referred to Governor Darkin’s office as stacked
with Japanese electronics, gifts from the Japanese lobbying for the Northern
route. Nevertheless, the Chinese had felt in southern route had the best chance
because: it was the most cost-effective and furthest along in planning.54 Jingji
Cankao claimed “Japan’s muddling” in the YUKOS-CNPC deal was testing
China’s energy strategy, which was still in the process of being formulated
while Japan had a “matured energy strategy” and a strategic reserve of 172
days (China has not yet created a strategic reserve.)55
Prime Minister Kasyanov signed the Russian Energy Strategy 2020 on
September 5, and had announced on September 6, 2003 that further deliberations
were needed on the pipeline decision.56 The Russian Natural Resources Ministry
had issued a negative environmental assessment on both proposed pipeline
routes. On the same day, Wu Bangguo Chairman of China’s NPC, was in Tokyo
giving a speech on “Strengthening Sino-Japanese Economic Cooperation and
Developing Sino-Japanese Good-Neighborliness and Friendship.”57
NE Asian energy cooperation – Formulation of rules
It is paradoxical that while Tokyo was promoting an East Asian energy
community, it was also making more public its interest in Russia’s Angarsk oil
52 Ibid.
53 Kyodo, August 27, 2003
54 “Old Rivalry Flares as China, Japan Vie for Russian Oil, China Daily, July 13, 2003
55 Li Dingxin, “Fighting for Oil Pipeline Tests China’s Energy Policy,” Jingji Cankao
Bao, August 8, 2003
56Interfax, September 5, 2003
57 Xinhua, September 5, 2003
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pipeline and Kovykta gas pipeline projects, placing it in competition with the
Chinese projects there. By summer 2003, as Tokyo appeared to be competing
with Beijing for a pipeline route from Russia, discussion of regional cooperation
could have been expected to be displaced by resource competition. Some
journalists proclaimed that this was a resource war between China and Japan as
they compete for scarce oil resources. Yet China and Japan continued to discuss
Northeast Asian regional energy cooperation.
The Institute of Energy Economics Japan published a paper in early 2003
stating the “rules of cooperation” for Northeast Asian energy cooperation.
The region was faced with the challenge of whether to cooperate or compete.
The IEEJ paper argued that cooperation should happen at the governmental
level, with government support for markets and private companies, creating an
even playing field for competition, which should happen at the business level.
The “rules of cooperation” for Northeast Asian energy cooperation were:
1. Every country must clearly recognize that each benefited from
cooperation as all were in the same situation and in the same region. (regional
identity rule)
2. Every country should take “equitable responsibility” if it were to obtain
its share of benefit. (the no-free rider rule)
3. Regional institutional design for cooperation must realize a win-win
situation. (co-prosperity rule)58
At the November 2003 Northeast Asia Petroleum Forum, one Japanese
analyst suggested additional rules that included the Angarsk issue:
4. Energy security through cooperation between East Asian and West
Asian countries, between energy consumers and producers. (Northeast Asian
unity in dialogue with Middle East rule)
5. Preparation of energy infrastructure, especially in “continental in land
region.” (Northeast Asian infrastructure as an international public good rule)
6. Construction of an international framework covering the upstream to
downstream supply network in East Siberia and Russian Far East. (Russian
resources are an international public good rule)
7. Preparation of international rules as a foundation for work with East
Siberia and RFE. (Russian resource development would follow mutually agreed
upon rules)
58 Kensuke Kanekiyo, Toward Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia Institute of Energy
Economics Japan, March 2003, found at: http://eneken.ieej.or.jp
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8. Strategic issues for regional cooperation: oil stockpiles; stabilization
of crude oil prices and oil market; development of a Northeast Asian oil market.
(oil is both a strategic and market issue rule)
9. Asia’s three E’s: economic growth, energy security and environmental
conservation. (three E’s rule)
10. Formation of a common perception among Asian consumer countries
that would unite them in government and private sector policymaking.59
(policymaking based on common identity rule)
Another presentation insisted that China, South Korea, and Japan were
not mere competitors but had common concerns and goals including
diversification of supply through projects such as Angarsk (both pipelines),
and relations with the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Iran). It proclaimed that
co-prosperity in Northeast Asia was possible.60 Still another Japanese
presentation analyzed the East Siberian pipeline project as comparable with
Sakhalin I & II projects, which would benefit all of Asia by increasing the
region’s bargaining power with the Middle East and consequently reducing
the “Asian premium” for all Northeast countries.61
Chinese participants at the November 2003 Forum discussed achieving
win-win solutions,62 and implementing the “going out” strategy further;63 but it
was unclear whether they contributed to rule formation for a Northeast Asian
multilateral energy regime. Chinese have previously commented favorably on a
Northeast Asian energy community but referred to the formula (regional division
of labor) rather than specify rules for cooperation. Also with regard to Russian
resources in this formula, Chinese analysts have stated “China has the
geographical advantage to utilize the energy resources of these (Russian)
59 Yoshiki Ogawa (IEEJ), “Long-term Views and Stategic Issues on Oil Supply-Demand
in Asia,” Northeast Asia Oil Forum, November 5, 2003, Tokyo, p.36, 40-46 Found at:
http;//eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/seminar/other/NAPF/NAPFrecords.htm.
60 Yasushi Kono (Nippon Oil Corp.), “From Competition to Co-Prosperity,” Northeast
Asia Oil Forum, November 5, 2003, Tokyo, p.36, 40-46 Found at: http;//eneken.ieej.or.jp/
en/seminar/other/NAPF/NAPFrecords.htm
61 Taro Shoji (Japan Petroleum Dev.Assoc.), “Energy Related Projects in Northeast
Asia,” Ibid.
62 Shen Wenxiang (CNOOC), “Holding onto Opportunities, Enlarging Cooperation,
Promoting the Development of China Offshore Oil Industry,” Northeast Asia Oil Forum,
November 2003, Tokyo.
63 Zhao Houxue (Sinopec), panel “Present situation and development strategies of the
oil industry,” Ibid
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adjacent areas,”64 reflecting the thinking of zhoubian waijiao rather than abstract
rulemaking for the region.
Post-Angarsk: Reaffirming the Energy Community
International organizations such as the IEA, and research institutes such
as ERINA, addressed the issue of Asian energy security under the influence of
the Iraq War. The IEA held a workshop with ASEAN in September 2003 to give
support to ASEAN energy policy makers in developing their national and regional
emergency preparedness response measures and to revise the 1986 ASEAN
Petroleum Security Agreement (APSA). The Malaysian participant noted that
his country was implementing the “Hiranuma Initiative” for oil security proposed
at the September 2002 Osaka ASEAN +3 Energy Ministers Meeting.
In October 2003, the APEC leaders endorsed a US initiative on energy
security, “Action Plan to Enhance Energy Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,”
to expand trade in natural gas (LNG), promote investment in alternative energy
sources, and create a real-time information sharing and coordination system in
the Asia-Pacific for emergency response.65 The emphasis on LNG, referring to
the Asia-Pacific as the “heart of the global LNG market, with half of the world’s
exports and 70 percent of imports.” Indicated the US was less interested in
natural gas pipelines.
The February 2004 meeting of the Northeast Asia Economic Conference/
Northeast Asia Economic Forum (NAEF) brought all of Northeast Asia together
to discuss regional cooperation, ASEAN+3, pipelines, and the “Grand Design
for Northeast Asia” in energy, transport and environment. The need for a
Northeast Asia Development bank was addressed as a necessary prerequisite
for regional infrastructure development.
The 2004 Niigata Energy Forum, held in conjunction with the NAEF,
addressed a cooperative approach to the energy security, economic
development and environment triad. The energy panel discussed the Northeast
Asian gas pipeline as the basis of creating an Asian energy community. ERINA
had a two-year research project to identify cooperative policies and broaden
the policy perspective of individual governments to think more regionally on
energy cooperation.66
64 Qingzhe Jiang and Lei Song, “Establishing a Northeast Asian Energy Community:
China’s Perspective,” in A Vision for Economic Cooperation in East Asia: China, Japan,
and Korea, Cho, Kim & Lee, eds. (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2003), p.226
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In March 2004, A Japanese presentation at the 8th International Conference
on Northeast Asian Natural Gas Pipeline, focused on Northeast Asian energy
demand and supply as whole, asserting that because of interdependence,
“China’s problem (energy demand) is the region’s problem to be mutually
solved.”67 Solutions he argued need government initiative the energy security
and cleaner environment provided by a regional natural gas pipeline could not
be calculated in a commercial project evaluation. Governments were responsible
for proper market design. The project was too large for the private sector.
Conclusion
China, despite a decade as a net oil importer, had not fully developed the
identity, the national interests, or the policies of a net oil importer that would
have allowed for participation in a Northeast Asian multilateral energy regime.
The need for an oil law had been under consideration since 1996 after China
became a net importer of crude oil in 1995, which was more of a shock than
when it became a net importer of petroleum product in 1993. In October 2001, an
energy analyst from the SDRC had claimed to have submitted a draft for an oil
law to the NPC to ensure Chinese oil security and to create a regulatory
framework for the domestic oil market68
Nevertheless, as late as March 2004, China’s National People’s Congress
was still calling for new laws to control petroleum demand and create a strategic
oil reserve in order to respond to “the oil crisis.” The NPC felt legislation was
needed to control the domestic oil market. NPC lawmakers wanted oil
conservation slogans to be codified into law so that those that squander oil are
punished.69
Also in March 2004, the China Daily claimed that China was pinning its
hopes on the Sino-Russian oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing, despite all the
indicators throughout 2003 that the southern route would not be chosen, and
the announcement the day before that Russia had chosen an alternative route
67 Kensuke Kanejiyo (IEEJ), “Diversifying Energy Sources of Northeast Asia,” presented
at the 8th International Conference on Northeast Asian Natural Gas Pipeline”, Shanghai,
March 8, 2004
68 Gong Zhengzheng, “PRC Analyst Views State Law Proposed to Strengthen Oil
Security,” China Daily, (Business Weekly Supplement), October 30, 2001
69 “Chinese Legislations Propose Law on development of Oil Resources,” Xinhua,
March 11, 2004
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to Nakhodka rather than to Daqing.70 Although the popular Chinese press had
posed the issue as a choice between the Chinese pipeline, Russian energy
analysts faced a more complex issue.
The real utility for Chinese oil security of the “Struggle for Angarsk” was
the way it mobilized the country to address oil scarcity issues coherently, a
step necessary for China to promulgate an oil law and to finally take conservation
seriously, and to participate with greater transparency in a Northeast Asian
energy regime.
A reading confined only to the popular press in China’ Japan and the US
on the “Struggle for Angarsk” would be misleading. Unlike popular sentiments
amplified by the media, the epistemic community of Northeast Asian energy
experts from China, Japan and South Korea continued on as they had before
2003, meeting periodically and continuing to construct rules for energy regime
formation. The Angarsk issue, rather than interrupt this process of regime
formation, was a crisis that required participants to adapt the regime to the
challenges presented incorporate the issues into the rules, and in the process
strengthens the regime.
70 Xie YE, “Nation Pins Hopes on Oil Project with Russia,” China Daily, March 23,
2004, p.9
